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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Maurice Anthony Staples timely appeals from an order relinquishing jurisdiction 
and an order denying Mr. Staples' request for leniency made pursuant to I.C.R. 35. The 
district court initially imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, 
following Mr. Staples guilty plea to domestic battery with traumatic injury. On appeal, 
Mr. Staples argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when 
it refused to augment the record with transcripts of various hearings. Additionally, 
Mr. Staples argues that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction and when it denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Staples was charged with attempted strangulation, aggravated assault, 
domestic assault in the presence of a child, and malicious injury to property. (R., pp.35-
37.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State reduced the attempted strangulation 
charge to domestic battery with traumatic injury, to which Mr. Staples pleaded guilty. 
(R., pp.65, 90.) In addition, the State dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.65, 90.) 
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.91-92.) Mr. Staples successfully completed a 
period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), and the district court suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.111-118.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Staples' 
probation. (R., pp.119-120.) Mr. Staples admitted to violating three terms of his 
probation, and the district court revoked his probation, but retained jurisdiction. 
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(R., p.144-145, 149-151.) The district court reviewed Mr. Staples' performance second 
rider and relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.158-162.) 
Mr. Staples filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by 
the district court. (R., pp.163-165.) Mr. Staples timely appealed from both the district 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
On appeal, Mr. Staples filed a motion to augment and suspend the briefing 
schedule, wherein he requested that the record on appeal be augmented with various 
transcripts and exhibits. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-7.) The State 
objected to Mr. Staples' requests for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter, 
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered 
its Order Augmenting the Record and granted Mr. Staples' request for augmentation 




1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Staples due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 
motion requesting leniency in light of new information indicating that his family is 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Staples Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an 
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues 
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Staples filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of 
various hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to relinquish 
jurisdiction, a district court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing. 
On appeal, Mr. Staples is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request 
for transcripts of the Admit/Deny hearing held on April 19, 2010, and the disposition 
hearing held on August 2, 2010.1 Mr. Staples asserts that the requested transcripts are 
1 Mr. Staples is not arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and 
equal protection when it denied his request for the sentencing hearing held on 
August 18, 2008, the sentencing hearing held on October 20, 2008, and the 
jurisdictional review hearing held on April 20, 2009, because the honorable Judge 
Whetherell presided over those proceedings and the honorable Judge Greenwood 
presided over the orders from which Mr. Staples appealed. As such, the honorable 
Judge Greenwood's knowledge of what occurred in those hearings is limited to the court 
minutes of those hearings, which are currently in the record on appeal. 
Additionally, Mr. Staples is not arguing that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him 
due process and equal protection when it denied his request for the a transcript of the 
jurisdictional review hearing held on January 13, 2011, because said hearing actually 
occurred on January 3, 2011, and that transcript is currently in the record on appeal. 
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relevant to the issues addressed at the rider review hearing because they occurred after 
sentencing. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Staples Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Staples With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His 
Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 
(1996)). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
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I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. 1/linois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
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certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p)roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
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provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
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appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the 
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 
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416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Staples fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Staples' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional 
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that 
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire 
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis 
added)). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
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proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Staples' Motion to Augment will 
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts 
support the district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his !.C.R. 35 
motion. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Staples' appellate 
sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Staples should either be provided 
with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Staples With 
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme 
Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due 
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 
U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell, "the 
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective 
appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ... [to} hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental 
postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable principles of justice 
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard."' Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
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the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
[T]he promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on 
appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel 
at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of 
any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Staples has not 
obtained full review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court 
observed that the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective 
assistance of counsel in a criminal action is a review of the American Bar Association 
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standards. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL 
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards still offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the 
district court's decision to relinquish Mr. Staples' probation. Counsel is also unable to 
advise Mr. Staples on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Staples is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Staples his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
The district court relinquished its jurisdiction based on the recommendation made 
by the Idaho Department of Correction's Addendum to the Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, APSI) that Mr. Staples was not motivated for treatment. However, 
when his rider performance is viewed as a whole, he did display motivation to 
accomplish his work related goals. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion 
when it relinquished jurisdiction. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Lee, 117 
Idaho 203, 205-06 (Ct. App.1990) ). "When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on 
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry 
is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 
(1989) (citing to Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App. 
1987) ). Mr. Staples does not contest whether the district court appropriately perceived 
its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of discretion. However, Mr. Staples does 
contest that the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. 
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The district court's reliance on the APSl's relinquishment recommendation 
constituted error because it did not accurately reflect his performance while on his 
second rider. The APSl's relinquishment recommendation was primarily based on 
Mr. Staples' alleged refusal to take responsibility for his emotional state and his alleged 
lack of participation in programming. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.279.)2 These broad characterizations are not entirely accurate. For example, 
Mr. Staples' inability to complete some of his programming was caused by a medical 
condition stemming from his contact lenses. Concerning this point Mr. Staples testified 
as follows: 
I wear contacts. I lost one while I was in county, so I only had one 
eye left. Well, at the time, I didn't have the solution and the case to put my 
contacts in, so they had to stay in my eye. 
Well after a, the contact started to get infected, which made my eye 
turn red and just gave me a horrible headache. But I tried to keep it in, 
because without that contact, I cannot see. 
01/03/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-13.) This testimony is consistent with the following from the 
APSI: 
[Mr. Staples] also explained why he didn't want to go to group (he had a 
headache because he had lost his contact lens about six months prior to 
this incident) and how he discussed it with the shift commander. In the 
end, Mr. Staples was sanctioned to an essay on proper protocol and 
[eight] hours of extra duty. 
(PSI, p.276.) The district court ignored this medical condition and reiterated the general 
claims made in the APSI about Mr. Staples' lack of motivation. (01/03/11 Tr., p.12, L.24 
- p.14, L.17.) The district court never addressed Mr. Staples' medical issue and 
2 The PSI and its various attachments were submitted in two bound sections. For ease 
of citation, the pages of two bound sections were numbered. The first stapled section 
begins with the cover of the May 29, 2008, PSI. The second stapled section ends on 
page 290. 
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whether it inhibited his ability to read and write, which was a prerequisite to completing 
assignments and understanding the materials discussed in groups. 
Mr. Staples performed well when it came to employment based activities. 
Mr. Staples performed between forty to fifty hours of community service while on his 
rider. (01/03/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.17 - p.10, L.2.) According to Mr. Staples' workforce 
readiness instructor: 
[Mr. Staples] has been very helpful with the Portfolio, he brings the hours 
every week, and if there is a problem he is very eager [to] help solve it. 
He has always been pleasant and respectful. 
(PSI, p.278.) Mr. Staples was also successful in his introduction to computers class and 
completed career planning and the portfolio section of pre-release. (PSI, p.278.) 
Despite this performance, the district court relied on the APSl's characterization of 
Mr. Staples as unmotivated. In coming to that conclusion, it is notable that the APSI 
and the district court never addressed Mr. Staples' forty to fifty hours of community 
service. 
In sum, Mr. Staples did display a positive work ethic in some of his endeavors 
while on his rider. When that is taken into consideration in light of his medical condition, 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Requesting Leniency In light Of New Information Indicating His Family Needs His 
Financial Support 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Staples has a family which needs his support. After he was sentenced, the 
mother of his children was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis, which exacerbated their 
need for his support. When this is considered in light of the mitigating factors, it 
supports the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 motion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Staples' I.C.R. 35 
Motion Requesting Leniency In light Of New Information Indicating That His 
Family Needs His Financial Support 
Mr. Staples argues that the unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, is 
unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of his family's need for his support. A motion to 
alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if 
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 1987), and State v. Lopez, 
106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
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protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Staples does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Staples must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001 ))). 
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under 
Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing to State v. 
Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984)). "If the sentence was not excessive when 
pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or 
additional information presented with the motion for reduction." State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 320 (2006) (citing Trent, 125 Idaho, at 253 (Ct. App. 1994) , and State v. 
Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App.1991) ). 
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In support of his I.C.R. 35 motion, Mr. Staples stated that the mother of his 
children was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis and that this condition has made it 
difficult for her to take care of her children. (R., p.164.) In addition, Mr. Staples 
indicated that he planned to complete an anger management course, a domestic 
violence course, and parenting classes. (R., p.164.) He also has guaranteed 
employment at Taco Johns and the Golden Crown. (R., p.164.) This new information 
evinces his family's need for him in the community and the fact he can support them 
with income and is willing to get the treatment required for him to provide them with 
emotion support as well. 
In addition to this new information, there are mitigating factors present in this 
case which support the conclusion that his sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, 
the fact that the victim3 initiated the violence in this matter is a mitigating factor. In 
State v. Buzzard, 114 Idaho 384, 386 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that provocation by the victim could be considered as a mitigating factor. See also 
State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 587 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[l]t is a mitigating factor that 
[the defendant] did not initiate the confrontation."). The record contains summaries of 
telephone calls between the victim and Mr. Staples, wherein the victim indicated that 
she provoked Mr. Staple by hitting him. (PSI, p.25-27.) In fact, the victim stated that 
she has a reputation in the community for violent outbursts. (PSI, p.25.) Approximately 
one week before the commission of the underlying offense, the victim "snapped" and 
began hitting Mr. Staples with a baseball bat (PSI, p.40.) Mr. Staples took the bat from 
the victim, and she lunged at him with a pair of scissors. (PSI, p.40.) Since this was not 
the couple's first domestic violence incident, Mr. Staples accepted all culpability as a 
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means to prevent the victim from incurring criminal liability. (PSI, p.38.) Since the 
victim has a history directing violence at Mr. Staples and initiated the altercation which 
resulted in the underlying offense, those factors should be afforded significant mitigating 
weight. 
Additionally, this was Mr. Staples' first felony offense, which is also a mitigating 
factor. (PSI, p.11.) An appellate court can consider a defendant's first offense as a 
mitigating factor. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 206 (Ct. App. 1990). 
In sum, the fixed portion of Mr. Staples is excessively harsh when it is viewed in 
light of the new information and the other mitigating factors. Therefore, the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Staples 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the district court with 
instruction to place him on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate. 
Alternatively, Mr. Staples respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his 
fixed sentence. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
3 The victim in this matter Mr. Staples' girlfriend, who is referenced in the preceding 
paragraph. 
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